Introduction
Do not begin the activities or complete the courses in this qualification journal until you have completed the Basic Inspector Certification Journal. You may complete the General Proficiency requirements contained in Appendix B together with the Technical Proficiency requirements outlined in this journal.
Before signing up for any course, be sure that you have checked and have met any prerequisites.
Required Reactor Engineering Inspector Training Courses
The following courses require completion of Appendix A as a prerequisite:
$
Reactor Full Series (either boiling-water reactor (BWR) or pressurized-water reactor (PWR)) C BWR Series = R-304B, R-504B, and R-624B or C PWR Series = R-304P, R-504P, and R-624P $ Basic Reactor Operations for alternate reactor type C R-104P, if you completed the BWR series C R-104B, if you completed the PWR series
The following course DOES NOT require the completion of Appendix A, but you must meet course prerequisites:
Engineering Individual Study Guide
TOPIC: (ISA-ENG-1) Component Design Bases Inspection

PURPOSE:
The purpose of this guide is to acquaint you with the actions taken by the NRC in the review of risk-significant components to verify their initial design and subsequent modifications to determine their capability to perform their intended safety function(s) and to discover any performance issues that hinder that capability. Additional actions include the review of operating experience and its affect on risksignificant components if not adequately assessed for its potential effect and how operator actions required by the plant=s design analysis are implemented into plant procedures. As a reactor engineering inspector, you will be required to understand how the inability of one or more components to perform as intended affects its associated system and causes increased risk for core damage and increased likelihood that the plant=s inherent redundancy may not be able to mitigate the loss of the safety functions of those components. In addition, you will understand that operating experience, based on the lessons learned at other facilities, need to be adequately assessed for similar potential affects at the inspected plant and the importance of ensuring the plant=s design analysis is properly translated into plant operating procedures.
5.
Define the contribution of each of the following documents to an CDBI and the benefit of each in determining the functional capability of one or more components and operator actions: a. design-basis documents b. licensing-basis documents c. calculations and analyses d. technical specifications e. design changes and modifications f. operator training manual g. maintenance procedures h. surveillance and inservice test procedure results i.
applicable vendor manuals j.
generic communications (information notices, bulletins, and generic letters) k. normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures 6.
For the listed documents in the previous question, state how each provides insights into the assessment of a licensee=s quality assurance program, at a minimum with regard to the design and functional capability of safety components.
7.
Develop a list of attributes that establishes a reasonable likelihood about the functional and operational capability of a selected component. For operator actions, develop a plan as to how a selected action will be assessed.
8.
Define the Reactor Oversight Program cornerstones that are verified by the reviews of components, operating experience, and operator actions via a CDBI.
TASKS:
1. Read the references in sufficient detail to perform adequately in accordance with the requirements of the evaluation criteria.
2.
Meet with your supervisor, or the person designated to be your resource for this activity, and discuss the answers to the questions listed under the evaluation criteria.
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Engineering Individual Study Guide TOPIC:
(ISA-ENG-2) The NRC=s Review of Temporary and Permanent Plant Modifications
PURPOSE:
The purpose of this activity is to acquaint you with the actions taken by the NRC in the review of both temporary and permanent plant modifications of power reactor facilities. As a reactor engineering inspector, you will be required to understand how design changes resulting in hardware modifications or different operating requirements of a facility can potentially impact the plant=s design and licensing basis, as well as the performance capability of safety systems and components. Justify why the NRC is concerned about agreement between the design change of a modification and the safety evaluation contained in the modification package. Be able to address the outside design basis and requirements for a license amendment for a design change.
6.
State at least five of the types of changes that comprise the category Apermanent plant modifications@ and the reason for the inclusion of each one.
7.
State at least five of the types of changes that comprise the category Atemporary plant modifications@ and the reason for the inclusion of each one.
8.
State which Reactor Oversight Program cornerstones are verified by the independent reviews of permanent and temporary plant modifications.
9.
List the following:
a. types of design documents that may be affected by modifications b. types of plant procedures that could be affected by modifications
TASKS:
2.
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Engineering Individual Study Activity
TOPIC:
(ISA-ENG-3) Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments (10 CFR 50.59) )
PURPOSE:
The purpose of this activity is to acquaint you with how to review safety evaluations that are used to determine if the power reactor facility change, test, or experiment requires NRC approval before implementation. As a reactor engineering inspector, you will be required to understand how design changes resulting in hardware modifications or different operating requirements of a facility can potentially impact the plant=s design and licensing basis, as well as the performance capability of safety systems and components.
The purpose of this activity is to do the following:
1.
Familiarize you with the NRC regulations governing changes, tests, and experiments for commercial nuclear power facilities.
2.
Enable you to demonstrate an ability to conduct an inspection under 10 CFR 50.59, AChanges, Tests, and Experiments,@ in accordance with IP 71111.17.
4.
Evaluate example changes, tests, or experiments to determine whether the licensee may perform them without prior NRC approval and evaluate the example changes for their affect on operability.
5.
Draft a notice of violation against 10 CFR 50.59.
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TOPIC:
(ISA-ENG-4) Basic Codes, Standards, and Regulatory Guides for Engineering Support
PURPOSE:
The purpose of this activity is to provide you with very fundamental knowledge of the basic NRC codes, RGs, and associated industry standards commonly used by engineering inspectors. This activity will also acquaint you with the requirements (codes), guidelines (RGs), and accepted methodologies (industry standards) for licensees to use in accomplishing various safety-related activities. Finally, this activity will prepare you to determine an individual licensee=s commitment to RGs and standards.
COMPETENCY
AREA: INSPECTION
LEVEL OF EFFORT: 40 hours
REFERENCES: See attached listings of general and discipline-related references.
EVALUATION
CRITERIA:
At the completion of this activity, you should be able to do the following:
1. State the general code sections commonly used by engineering inspectors and discuss the topics included in these sections.
2.
Discuss the relationship between RGs and industry standards.
3.
Identify the RGs and associated industry standards that address the quality assurance criteria in Appendix B, AQuality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants,@ to 10 CFR Part 50.
4.
Discuss the topics included in the RGs and industry standards associated with your engineering discipline.
5.
Discuss the application of these references to engineering inspection activities.
TASKS:
1. Read Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 and review a selected licensee=s quality assurance manual. Review a sample of licensee implementing procedures (such as those associated with engineering inspectionsCdesign control and corrective action) in accordance with an evaluation criterion to explain how a typical licensee meets the requirements.
2.
Review the references in the attached list of general references as well as those listed for your specific discipline.
3.
Locate the listing of RGs on the NRC external Web page.
4.
Review a plant-specific UFSAR to identify the licensee=s commitments to particular RGs and standards.
5.
Discuss with experienced inspectors any questions you have concerning the topics of the references or their application to inspection activities.
6.
Meet with your supervisor to demonstrate your familiarity with the applicable references and discuss the applications of these references to engineering inspection activities.
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Engineering 
PURPOSE:
The Significance Determination Process (SDP), as described in Appendix A to IMC 0609, aids NRC inspectors and staff in determining the safety significance of inspection findings, including the categorization of individual findings into one of four response bands, using risk insights when appropriate. The SDP determinations for inspection findings and the performance indicator information are combined for use in assessing licensee performance. The purpose of this activity is for you to gain the requisite knowledge, understanding, and practical ability such that upon completion of this activity, you will be able to apply the SDP to reactor inspection findings for at-power situations to determine their safety significance. 
EVALUATION
CRITERIA:
1. Explain the purpose, objectives, and applicability of the SDP process. 
4.
Whenever possible, attend a significance determination and enforcement review panel. Discuss the rationale for the outcome/resolution of the panel with a qualified inspector.
5.
Meet with your supervisor or a qualified inspector to discuss any questions you may have as a result of this training activity.
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Scenario A During the Unit 1 spring 1R16 refueling outage (RFO), plant staff identified that control rod drive mechanism nozzle XX was leaking. Workers repaired the nozzle weld and returned the unit to operation for another cycle. When the unit was shut down for RFO 1R17, visual examination of the reactor vessel head revealed repeat leakage of the nozzle. Based on the 1R16 RFO leakage, licensee staff performed an embedded flaw repair in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Code. However, the licensee staff recently concluded that this repair method is inadequate to prevent recurrence of the original primary water stresscorrosion cracking.
Based on this scenario, complete the following steps:
1. Using Appendices B and E to IMC 0612, determine if the issue is more than a minor one. List the key conditions of the scenario that you will consider in determining if the issue is more than a minor one and that could be used to determine the safety significance of the issue.
2.
If you determine the issue to be more than a minor one, proceed to step 5. On September 27, 2002, at 12:19 a.m., the condenser off-gas 182 alarm cleared. At 10:25 a.m., the N-16 alarm returned. At 10:40 a.m., the condenser off-gas 182 alarm came in, followed by the condenser off-gas 182 Hi alarm at 10:51 a.m. At 1:06 p.m., these alarms cleared. These alarms came in twice more on this day. At 7:54 p.m., the condenser offgas 182 alarm came in, and at 10:32 p.m., the condenser off-gas 182 HiHi alarm was reached. The alarms cleared in less than an hour.
On September 28, 2002, at 1:40 a.m., the Unit 1 control room operators commenced power reduction in response to the 1-02 steam generator tube leak. At 3:12 a.m., the Unit 1 control room operators performed a planned trip of the Unit 1 reactor.
Through subsequent inspection and testing, the licensee determined the source of the leakage to be a stress-corrosion crack initiating from the outer diameter surface in the Ubend region of tube R41C71 of the No. 2 steam generator. The licensee also determined through pressure testing that the tube failed to exhibit structural and accident leakage integrity margins consistent with the plant design and licensing basis. The inspection team concluded that an experienced analyst should have recognized that the large wobble signal could mask a dent that could distort or rotate an indication outside the reportable phase angle response criteria. In such a case, the guidelines enabled the analyst to bring the indication to the attention of the lead analyst and the senior analyst. Therefore, the team determined that the analyst should have recognized the large wobble signal and should have brought it to the attention of a senior analyst.
As a direct consequence of the failure to detect the flaw, the tube was not removed from service and subsequently degraded to the point that it leaked and no longer satisfied the applicable tube integrity performance criteria. This occurred because the examination methods and the analysis guidelines used during the RFO were not effective for ensuring that tubes would maintain their integrity until the next scheduled inspection.
If you determine the issue to be a minor one, proceed to step 5. While the licensee was able to determine the operability of the affected instruments through the bounding voltage drop calculation, the licensee=s existing design basis (the assumptions in the degraded voltage calculation) had not been adequately verified or maintained. The design-basis assumption relied on testing the instruments at 95 Vac; however, the licensee did not test some instruments and replaced others without retesting the specific instrument at the assumed degraded voltage included in the calculation. Therefore, the licensee had failed to maintain accurate design-basis assumptions that were essential for its design-basis calculation.
If you determine the issue to be minor, proceed to step 5.
3.
If you determine the issue to be more than a minor one, use the SDP Phase 1 Screening Worksheet in Appendix A to IMC 0609 to determine if the issue is of Green significance or if more analysis is required. Do not perform the additional analysisCdo not perform a phase II or phase III SDP. Be able to justify your determination. 
Scenario D
The licensee did not identify potential common-mode failures that existed involving power supplies to the recirculation line air-operated valve in the auxiliary feedwater system and other system components. In addition, the licensee=s corrective actions for the potential common-mode failure associated with a loss of instrument air did not prevent the failures from repeating. Although the licensee upgraded the safety function of the air-operated recirculation valve, this corrective action failed to ensure that successful operation of the recirculation line air-operated valve depended only on safety-related support systems. After the corrective actions, successful operation of the valve still depended upon nonsafety-related power to an interposing relay. In addition, the corrective actions did not to discover a single failure mechanism involving a system orifice modification.
2.
3.
5.
Discuss your results with your supervisor or a qualified inspector.
Scenario E
During an RFO, the licensee tested a charging pump at full-flow conditions as required every 18 months. Vibration data taken during this test indicated vibration of 0.324 inches per second (ips), which exceeded the test procedure alert range of 0.320 ips. The procedure required the surveillance frequency to be increased to every 9 months after exceeding the alert range. The licensee failed to identify that the test result exceeded the alert range and did not increase the test frequency. Subsequent vibration testing revealed no further vibration degradation. The ASME Code acceptance criterion for vibration measurements is 0.325 ips.
2.
If you determine the issue to be a minor one, proceed to step 5.
3.
If you determine the issue to be more than a minor one, use the SDP Phase 1 Screening Worksheet in Appendix A to IMC 0609 to determine if the issue is of Green significance or if more analysis is required. Do not perform the additional analysisCdo not perform a phase II or phase III SDP. Be able to justify your determination.
4.
Compare your conclusions with those given in the actual findings or case studies.
(See Appendix E to IMC 0612.)
5.
Scenario F
The licensee failed to consider one maintenance preventable functional failure (MPFF) of a system component during its demonstration of the effectiveness of preventive maintenance, in accordance with the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65(a)(2)). The Maintenance Rule requires, in part, that monitoring as specified in 10 CFR 50.65(a) (1) is not required if the licensee can demonstrate that it is effectively controlling the performance or condition of a structure, system, or component (SSC) through appropriate preventive maintenance, such that the item remains capable of performing its intended function. When the additional MPFF was considered, the conclusion from the demonstration remained valid.
2.
If you determine the issue to be a minor one, proceed to step 5. 
Demonstrate your ability to conduct inspection activities as applied to a CDBI (IP 71111.21).
3.
Demonstrate your ability to locate and identify design-and licensing-basis information.
4.
Demonstrate your familiarity with the design and licensing bases for the component(s) selected by the CDBI team inspection plan. Identify critical parameters and performance criteria.
5.
Demonstrate your ability to identify critical equipment required to achieve the design-basis function of the selected system(s).
6. Demonstrate your ability to develop an individualized inspection plan for the discipline/component/operating experience/operator action you are assigned from the team inspection plan.
7.
Discuss your conclusions regarding the capability of your assigned component(s) to achieve its design-and licensingbasis functions. Provide the bases for that conclusion (e.g., evaluations, testing, performance history, etc.).
8.
Discuss your conclusions regarding the licensee=s evaluation and implementation of corrective actions of your assigned operating experience.
9.
Discuss your conclusions regarding the implementation of your assigned operator action and whether they can be performed in accordance with the plant=s design bases. Provide the bases for that conclusion (e.g. simulator scenario, in plant walkdown, procedure review, etc.)
10. Demonstrate your capability to document your inspection findings consistent with IMC 0612.
11. Demonstrate your familiarity with SDP Group 1, 2, and 3 questions in IMC 0612 for an actual or simulated finding.
TASKS:
1. Perform the tasks listed in IMC 1245, Appendix A, On-the-Job Activity 4, AInspection Activities,@ as applied to an inspection focused on IP 71111.21.
2.
Review IP 71111.21 and IP 71152 for an overview of CDBI activity.
3.
Review previous CDBI reports to improve your understanding of the implementation of IP 71111.21.
4.
Review site-specific design-and licensing-basis documentation, provided during preparation week, to become familiar with the design and licensing bases for the components selected for review in the team inspection plan.
5.
Develop an individualized inspection plan for the component/operating experience/operator action you are assigned.
6. Identify specific critical equipment required for the safety system to achieve its design-and licensing-basis functions.
7.
Review available information to determine if equipment is capable of achieving and maintaining its design function. Such information includes vendor manuals, specification documents, maintenance and testing documents, problem identification reports, etc.
8.
Based on your inspection activity, assess if the component is capable of meeting its design function.
9.
Based on your inspection activity, assess if the licensee=s evaluation and implementation of corrective actions of your assigned operating experience was acceptable.
10. Based on your inspection activity, assess if the operator action can be performed in accordance with the plant=s design bases.
11. Perform a walkdown of accessible portions of the selected components and its associated system.
12. For at least one observed or simulated finding, apply SDP to the issue.
13. Meet with your supervisor or a qualified inspector designated by your supervisor and discuss the result of your activities.
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For selected modifications, demonstrate your ability to identify the design safety function of the SSC and the design requirements.
4.
For each modification, discuss the licensee=s approach to assuring that the modification did not adversely impact the design, availability, reliability, or functional capability of the SSC.
5.
Demonstrate an understanding of potential risk-significant plant configurations that could occur during modification implementation and identify the licensee=s method for addressing them.
6. Demonstrate your ability to document your inspection findings consistent with IMC 0612.
7.
Demonstrate your familiarity with the SDP Group 1, 2, and 3 questions in IMC 0612 for an actual or simulated finding.
TASKS:
1. Perform the tasks listed in Entry-Level On-the-Job Activity 4, as applied to an inspection focused on IP 71111.17.
2.
With the regional probabilistic risk assessment specialist, discuss which systems or equipment modifications have the highest risk significance.
3.
For the modifications selected, determine the intended safety function and design requirements for the applicable SSC.
4.
For the modifications selected, determine the motivation for the change (e.g., problem report, equipment failure, etc.) and verify that the modification resolved the problem.
5.
Review testing and inspection documentation after the modification and verify that the testing was adequate to assure that the functional capability or design function of the SSC was not degraded.
6.
Review the plant configuration for modification implementation and testing. Review the licensee=s actions to assure that the plant was not placed in a risk-significant configuration.
7.
When possible, perform a field walkdown of the SSC modified and determine whether the final condition was as designed by the modification documentation.
8. For a change in or substitution of component parts via the procurement or modification process, review equivalency evaluations that validate the adequacy of the replacement part.
9.
For at least one observed or simulated finding, apply SDP to the issue.
10. Meet with your supervisor or a qualified inspector designated by your supervisor and discuss the result of your activities.
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Engineering On-the-Job Activity TOPIC: (OJT-ENG-4) Security Plan and Implementation
PURPOSE:
The purpose of this activity is to familiarize you with a typical security plan for a nuclear facility.
physical security inspector. Include practical circumstances that you may encounter, such as the loss of a security badge or the identification of an inattentive guard. In addition, discuss any questions that you may have as a result of this activity.
5.
Meet with your supervisor or a qualified inspector designated by your supervisor and discuss the result of your activities.
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Reactor Engineering Technical Proficiency-Level Signature Card and Certification 
